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SHALL THE TWAIN NEVER MEET?
COMPETING NARRATIVES AND DISCOURSES
OF THE RULE OF LAW IN SINGAPORE
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee∗
This article aims to assess the role played by the rule of law in discourse by critics of the Singapore
Government’s policies and in the Government’s responses to such criticisms. It argues that in the
past the two narratives clashed over conceptions of the rule of law, but there is now evidence of
convergence of thinking as regards the need to protect human rights, though not necessarily as to
how the balance between rights and other public interests should be struck. The article also examines
why the rule of law must be regarded as a constitutional doctrine in Singapore, the legal implications
of this fact, and how useful the doctrine is in fostering greater solicitude for human rights.
Singapore is lauded for having a legal system that is, on the whole, regarded as one of
the best in the world,1 and yet the Government is often vilified for breaching human
rights and the rule of law. This is not a paradox—the nation ranks highly in surveys
examining the effectiveness of its legal system in the context of economic compet-
itiveness, but tends to score less well when it comes to protection of fundamental
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University. I wish to thank Sui Yi
Siong for his able research assistance.
1 See e.g., Lydia Lim, “S’pore Submits Human Rights Report to UN” The Straits Times (26 February
2011):
On economic, social and cultural rights, the report [by the Government for Singapore’s Universal
Periodic Review] lays out Singapore’s approach and achievements, and cites glowing reviews by
leading global bodies. These include the World Economic Forum and the International Institute
for Management Development’s ranking of Singapore’s legal system as among the best in the
world.
For details, see Klaus Schwab, ed., The Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013 (Geneva: World
Economic Forum, 2012) at 11, 13, 14, 318 and 319, online: World Economic Forum <http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf> (last accessed: 3 October 2012;
archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/6B7ewMk8k>) (Singapore’s overall ranking was 5.67 out
of 7, second out of 144 economies); James Gwartney, Robert Lawson & Joshua Hall, Eco-
nomic Freedom of the World: 2012 Annual Report (Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute, 2012) at 10,
146, online: Fraser Institute <http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-
news/research/publications/economic-freedom-of-the-world-2012.pdf> (last accessed: 3 October
2012) (overall ranking of 8.69 out of 10 in 2010, second out of 144 countries surveyed); “The World
Competitiveness Scoreboard 2012” in IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2012 (Lausanne: Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development 2012) at 6, online: International Institute for Management
Development <http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf> (last accessed:
3 October 2012; archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/6B7e6UmTF>) (overall ranking of 95.923
out of 100, fourth out of 55 economies surveyed).
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liberties.2 The Government is unapologetic, and has publicly stated that its focus is
the country’s economic development and stability. It disagrees with the more liberal
views on human rights espoused by critics, charging them with a lack of knowledge
and sensitivity to the local culture and situation. It points to the fact that the electoral
success of the ruling People’s Action Party (“PAP”) since 1959 constitutes voter
endorsement of its policies. During this discourse, both sides have relied on the doc-
trine of the rule of law, the Government maintaining that it has complied fully with it,
and critics arguing that the rule of law in Singapore “has given way to empty legalism”
and is in “demise”,3 or has been systematically “dismantle[d]”4 by the Government.5
This article aims to assess the role played by the rule of law in discourse by critics
of the Government’s policies and in the Government’s responses to such criticisms.
To set the scene, Part I justifies why the rule of law must be regarded as a doctrine
embodied in the Singapore Constitution,6 and the legal implications of this fact. The
first section of Part II then describes two series of incidents that have generated much
of the criticism about the Government’s adherence to the rule of law. These concern
the use of the Internal Security Act (“ISA”)7 to detain without trial persons deemed
to pose a national security risk, and the bringing of defamation suits by members of
the Cabinet and the PAP against opposition politicians. Rather than attempting to
examine the correctness of the positions taken by either the critics or the Government,
in the second section of Part II of the article I identify the conceptions of the rule
of law adopted and consider if there is any congruence between them. I conclude
in Part III with some thoughts on whether present conditions are conducive to the
Government and its critics starting to work towards consensus on the extent to which
Singapore law should respect human rights standards, and the utility of the rule of
law doctrine in this regard.
I. Understandings of the Rule of Law
A. The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle
The rule of law doctrine is not merely a legal principle but a constitutional one. This
has been recognized in the context of the United Kingdom’s unwritten constitution, as
2 For instance, the World Press Freedom Index 2012 ranked Singapore 135 out of 179 countries: World
Press Freedom Index 2012 (Paris: Reporters Without Borders, 2012), online: Reporters Without Borders
<http://en.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2012/CLASSEMENT_ANG.pdf> (last accessed: 3 October
2012; archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/6B7grecq8>).
3 Beatrice S. Frank et al., The Decline in the Rule of Law in Singapore and Malaysia: A Report of the
Committee on International Human Rights of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York (New
York: The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1990) at 46 [Decline in the Rule of Law].
The portion of the report dealing with Singapore was also published as “Decline of the Rule of Law in
Malaysia and Singapore Part II—Singapore” (1991) 46 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York 7.
4 Asia Watch, Silencing All Critics: Human Rights Violations in Singapore (NewYork: Asia Watch, 1989)
at 1.
5 Li-ann Thio, “Rex Lex or Lex Rex? Competing Conceptions of the Rule of Law in Singapore” (2002)
20 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 1 at 6 [Thio, “Rex Lex or Lex Rex?”].
6 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev. Ed. Sing.) [Singapore Constitution].
7 Cap. 143, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing. [ISA].
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well as in constitutional texts such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.8
In Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association,9 a decision of the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales, Ward L.J. said that he was “entitled to presume that Parliament
always intends to conform to the rule of law as a constitutional principle”;10 and in Re
Manitoba Language Rights11 the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the rule of law
was “a fundamental principle of our Constitution”.12 The preamble to the Charter
specifies that “Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of
God and the rule of law”, but over and above this, the Court held:13
[T]he [rule of law] principle is clearly implicit in the very nature of a Constitution.
The Constitution, as the Supreme Law, must be understood as a purposive ordering
of social relations providing a basis upon which an actual order of positive laws
can be brought into existence. The founders of this nation must have intended,
as one of the basic principles of nation building, that Canada be a society of legal
order and normative structure: one governed by rule of law. While this is not set
out in a specific provision, the principle of the rule of law is clearly a principle of
our Constitution.
Thio Li-ann has expressed the view that although the rule of law is not mentioned
in the Singapore Constitution, “it has through practice entered Singapore’s constitu-
tional and political lexicon”.14 There is, in fact, a strong basis for the constitutional
status of the rule of law in Singapore. Re Manitoba Language Rights noted that the
rule of law “has always been understood as the very basis of the English Constitution
characterising the political institutions of England from the time of the Norman Con-
quest”.15 The backbone of Singapore’s Constitution is formed by the Constitution of
the State of Singapore16 that the nation possessed when it was part of the Federation
of Malaysia, supplemented with provisions of the Federal Constitution upon Singa-
pore’s full independence in 1965.17 In the words of the Privy Council in Hinds v. The
Queen,18 such written constitutions granted by the United Kingdom to her former
8 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms].
9 [1998] Ch. 304 (C.A.).
10 Ibid. at 337. See also Paul P. Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An
Analytical Framework” [1997] P.L. 467 at 487: “[T]he rule of law is rightly regarded as a central
principle of constitutional governance.”
11 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.).
12 Ibid. at para. 59. See also Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.), at para. 32 (the
paragraph references are to the Westlaw version of the case report).
13 Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra note 11 at para. 68.
14 Thio, “Rex Lex or Lex Rex?”, supra note 5 at 1. InATreatise on Singapore Constitutional Law (Singapore:
Academy Publishing, 2012) at para. 3.051, Thio states: “The text of the Singapore constitution is silent
and contains no express provision on the rule of law; however it has been the subject of parliamentary
debate and judicial affirmation.”
15 Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra note 11 at para. 67.
16 The Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore (State Constitutions) Order in Council 1963 (S.I. 1963 No. 1493),
published in the Subsidiary Legislation Supplement of the State of Singapore Government Gazette
as Sp. No. S 1 of 1963. Following full independence, the State Constitution was amended by the
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1965 (No. 8 of 1965).
17 These were applied to Singapore by the Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965 (No. 9 of 1965,
1985 Rev. Ed. Sing.), s. 6.
18 [1977] A.C. 195 (P.C.) (on appeal from Jamaica).
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colonies were “negotiated as well as drafted by persons nurtured in the tradition of
that branch of the common law of England that is concerned with public law”, and
“[t]he new constitutions, particularly in the case of unitary states, were evolutionary
not revolutionary”.19 Thus, in Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Attorney-General,20
the High Court was able to say that “the Constitution is based essentially on the
Westminster model and adopts and codifies most, if not all, of the laws, customs,
conventions and practices of the British constitutional and parliamentary system”.21
It was on such grounds that the High Court held, in the 2012 case of Mohammad
Faizal bin Sabtu v. Public Prosecutor,22 that the doctrine of the separation of powers
was embodied in the Singapore Constitution. The same must be true of the rule
of law.
Furthermore, the text of the Constitution reflects the rule of law principle. Con-
stitutionalism is the idea that a government is limited by what the constitution of the
state requires and cannot simply act as it pleases. To ensure compliance, the Sin-
gapore Constitution declares its own status as fundamental law and empowers the
courts to examine the compatibility of executive and legislative acts with its terms
by means of judicial review. In Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General,23 the Court of
Appeal stated:24
The supremacy of the Constitution is necessary for the purposes of the Constitu-
tion to be protected as it ensures that the institutions created by the Constitution
are governed by the rule of law, and that the fundamental liberties under the
Constitution are guaranteed.
The courts’ judicial review role is emphasized by art. 4 and 162 of the Constitution.
Article 4 declares the Constitution to be “the supreme law of the Republic of Singa-
pore”, and thus “any law enacted by the Legislature after the commencement of this
Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be void”. Article 162 states that laws which existed at the time of the
Constitution’s commencement on 9 August 196525 “continue in force on and after
the commencement of this Constitution”, but must be “construed… with such mod-
ifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring
them into conformity with this Constitution”. The wording of art. 162 suggests that
the courts are not empowered by this provision to entirely invalidate laws existing
at the time of the Constitution’s commencement. Nonetheless, in Tan Eng Hong the
Court of Appeal took the view that a purposive reading of art. 4 and 162 indicates
that such laws can be declared void under art. 4.26
Though the Constitution is silent on which branch of government is responsible
for giving effect to art. 4 and 162, the High Court has asserted in Chan Hiang Leng
19 Ibid. at 212.
20 [1987] S.L.R.(R.) 472 (H.C.).
21 Ibid. at para. 9.
22 [2012] 4 S.L.R. 947 at paras. 11–13 (H.C.) [Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu].
23 [2012] 4 S.L.R. 476 (C.A.) [Tan Eng Hong].
24 Ibid. at para. 60.
25 Singapore Constitution, supra note 6, art. 2(1): “‘commencement’, used with reference to this
Constitution, means 9th August 1965”.
26 Tan Eng Hong, supra note 23 at paras. 59–61.
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Colin v. Public Prosecutor27 that it is the court’s task to do so:28
The court has the power and duty to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution
are observed. The court also has a duty to declare invalid any exercise of power,
legislative and executive, which exceeds the limits of the power conferred by
the Constitution, or which contravenes any prohibition which the Constitution
provides.
In Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong29 the Court of Appeal explicitly drew a
link between the courts’ judicial review role and the rule of law: “The courts, in
upholding the rule of law in Singapore, will no doubt readily invalidate laws that
derogate from the Constitution which is the supreme law of our land.”30 These
expressions of the courts’role are in line with the reasoning employed in the landmark
case Marbury v. Madison.31 In Marbury the Supreme Court of the United States
said it was clear that the duty of securing observance of the Constitution by the
political branches of government falls upon the courts as this is an aspect of judicial
power; the same is true in Singapore since the Constitution vests the judicial power
of Singapore solely in the courts.32 Part VIII of the Constitution contains various
provisions that seek to safeguard the independence of the Supreme Court judiciary,
which is primarily responsible for carrying out judicial review. The effectiveness
of constitutional judicial review by the courts is thus assured by the principle of
separation of powers, which the High Court characterized in Mohammad Faizal bin
Sabtu33 as “part of the basic structure of the Singapore Constitution”.34
It is submitted that the court’s assertion of a jurisdiction to subject executive action
and legislation to judicial review for compliance with the Constitution reinforces the
fact that the rule of law doctrine underlies the constitutional order in Singapore. For
the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the latter fact is also buttressed by
the High Court’s exercise of judicial review in administrative law. As Simon Brown
J. stated in R v. Committee of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
acting for the Visitor of the University of London, ex parte Vijayatunga:35 “Judicial
review is the exercise of the court’s inherent power at common law to determine
whether action is lawful or not; in a word to uphold the rule of law”.36
27 [1994] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 209 (H.C.).
28 Ibid. at para. 50, citing Harry Gibbs, “The Court as Guardian of the Constitution: The Basic Principle”
in Mohamed Salleh Abas & Visu Sinnadurai, eds., Law, Justice and the Judiciary: Transnational Trends
(Kuala Lumpur: Professional Law Book Publishers, 1998) at 51–66. This passage was also mentioned
in Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 78 at para. 14 (H.C.) [Taw Cheng Kong
(H.C.)]; and see Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu, supra note 22 at para. 14: “Singapore’s Westminster
model is based on the supremacy of the Singapore Constitution, with the result that the Singapore courts
may declare anAct of the Singapore parliament invalid for inconsistency with the Singapore Constitution
and, hence, null and void.”
29 [1998] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 489 (C.A.) [Taw Cheng Kong (C.A.)].
30 Ibid. at para. 89.
31 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) at 176-178 [Marbury].
32 Singapore Constitution, supra note 6, art. 93.
33 Supra note 22.
34 Ibid. at para. 11.
35 [1988] Q.B. 322 (H.C.).
36 Ibid. at 343, cited in R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] Q.B. 120 at para. 34 (C.A.).
Sing. J.L.S. Shall the Twain Never Meet? 303
The fact that the rule of law is a constitutional principle is significant because
the Prime Minister and other Cabinet ministers, Members of Parliament, and judges
are bound to “preserve, protect and defend” the Constitution.37 Ordinary legislation
and common law rules that are incompatible with the principle must also yield to
it. In Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs38 the Court of Appeal expressed
the obiter view that exercises of discretion by the President and the Home Affairs
Minister relating to detentions without trial under the ISA should be assessed by the
court objectively rather than from the subjective point of view of these persons since,
among other things, “the notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion is contrary
to the rule of law”.39 The Court thus declined to follow the earlier decision Lee
Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs,40 in which the High Court had applied a
subjective test. These cases are discussed in more detail below. While the Court of
Appeal did not specifically identify the rule of law as a constitutional doctrine, the
case illustrates how a court might utilize the doctrine to invalidate an existing legal
rule.
Furthermore, the doctrine empowers courts to grant suitable remedies in constitu-
tional law cases. It was relied on, for instance, in Re Manitoba Language Rights,41
which involved a highly unusual set of facts. The province of Manitoba’s constitu-
tion, the Manitoba Act, 187042 (which is deemed to be part of the Constitution of
Canada),43 requires that all statutes be enacted in both English and French. However,
in 1890, the province passed the Official Language Act44 which specified that, hence-
forth, statutes only had to be enacted in English. Two county court decisions held
this Act to be unconstitutional, but they were neither appealed nor even reported, and
were ignored by the provincial government. Subsequently, in 1979 another case45
reached the Supreme Court of Canada, which confirmed that the Official Language
Act was void. The provincial government then began translating and re-enacting all
statutes passed since 1890. Before it could finish the task, a motorist who had been
charged with speeding argued that the charge could not stand because the statute
creating the offence was invalid, not having been enacted in French. The Mani-
toba courts rejected the defence,46 but when the case was appealed to the Supreme
Court, the Federal Government referred the matter to the Court for an advisory
opinion on the validity of all statutes of Manitoba that had been enacted only in
English.47
37 Singapore Constitution, supra note 6, art. 27, 61 and 97, and Forms 2, 3, and 6 of the First Schedule.
38 [1988] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 525 (C.A.) [Chng Suan Tze].
39 Chng Suan Tze, ibid. at para. 86, cited in Lim Teng Ee Joyce v. Singapore Medical Council
[2005] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 709 at para. 15 (H.C.); Law Society of Singapore v. Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2
S.L.R. (R.) 239 at para. 149 (C.A.); Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney-General [2011] 2 S.L.R. 1189 at para. 78
(C.A.); and Ramalingam Ravinthran v. Attorney-General [2012] 2 S.L.R. 49 at para. 17 (C.A.).
40 [1971–1973] S.L.R.(R.) 135 (H.C.) [Lee Mau Seng].
41 Supra note 11.
42 Originally (U.K.) 1870 (33 Vict.), c. 3.
43 Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(2)(b), Sch. Item 2, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11.
44 Official Language Act, 1890, c. 14.
45 Attorney General of Manitoba v. Forest [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1032 (S.C.).
46 Bilodeau v. Attorney General of Manitoba [1981] 5 W.W.R. 393 (C.A.).
47 Peter W. Hogg, “Necessity in a Constitutional Crisis: The Manitoba Language Rights Reference” (1989)
15 Monash U.L. Rev. 253 at 253, 254.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the unconstitutionality of the Official Language Act
and held that all statutes that had not been enacted in both English and French
were invalid. This conclusion had the devastating consequence of creating a “legal
vacuum”48 in Manitoba. The view has been taken that the vacuum could never be
filled because purported changes to the structure of the provincial legislature and to
voting rights since 1890 meant that the legislature itself was invalid and could not
enact remedial legislation. Neither was an amendment to the Canadian Constitution
possible, because s. 43 of the Constitution Act, 198249 requires an amendment not
applicable to all provinces to be “authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of
Commons and of the legislative assembly of each province to which the amendment
applies”. If the Manitoba legislature itself was invalid, it could not pass any such
resolution.50
However, the Court also held that since the constitutional guarantee of the rule of
law would not tolerate Manitoba lacking a valid and effectual legal system for the
present and the future, the doctrine empowered the Court to deem the improperly
enacted statutes of the province “temporarily valid and effective… for the period of
time during which it would be impossible for the Manitoba legislature to fulfil its
constitutional duty” of re-enacting and publishing these statutes in accordance with
the Manitoba constitution’s terms.51
B. What the Rule of Law Entails
The Supreme Court of Canada reached the result mentioned above by relying on the
principle that, arguably at the most fundamental level, the rule of law “requires the
creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which preserves and
embodies the more general principle of normative order”.52 The Court was entitled
to apply the novel remedy of granting temporary validity to invalid laws because
the rule of law could not countenance a situation where a polity is effectively left
ungoverned by law.
More familiar, perhaps, is the characterization of the rule of law as a doctrine
holding that the state and its officials may only act in accordance with the law, and
may not ignore its strictures.53 One is immediately confronted with the question of
what the term ‘law’ entails. In his seminal 2004 work, On the Rule of Law: History,
Politics, Theory,54 Brian Tamanaha explains that there are two different senses at
play here. The first is that ‘law’ simply refers to the body of valid laws—both
legislation and common law rules—that is currently in force. The state is required
48 Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra note 11 at para. 59.
49 Supra note 8.
50 Hogg, supra note 47 at 255.
51 Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra note 11 at para. 89; see also Hogg, ibid. at 256, 257.
52 Re Manitoba Language Rights, ibid. at para. 64.
53 See e.g., Re Manitoba Language Rights, ibid. at para. 63: “[T]he law is supreme over officials of the
government as well as private individuals, and thereby preclusive of the influence of arbitrary power.”;
Thio, “Rex Lex or Lex Rex?”, supra note 5 at 1, 2: “In opposing political absolutism, it [the rule of
law] avers that no man is above the law and the law’s supremacy (lex rex) in contradistinction to the
rule of man (rex lex).”; Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004) c. 9 at 114.
54 Tamanaha, ibid.
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to comply with it, but is not barred from changing it. The second sense is that ‘law’
also embodies constraints on the power of lawmakers to change the law.55
However, differences of opinion exist as to the nature of these constraints. In this
article, I adopt the typology of theories of the rule of law identified by Tamanaha.
He notes that the rule of law may be categorized into formal versions and substantive
versions, and describes them in this manner: “[F]ormal theories focus on the proper
sources and form of legality, while substantive theories also include requirements
about the content of the law (usually that it must comport with justice or moral
principle).” However, there is some overlap—“the formal versions have substantive
implications and the substantive versions incorporate formal requirements”.56
Within the formal and substantive versions, ‘thinner’and ‘thicker’ formulations of
the rule of law may be identified. At the thin end of formal versions of the rule is the
idea of ‘rule by law’, which simply requires that governments act only on the basis
of laws but says nothing about the standards that such laws ought to comply with.
Rule by law imposes few, if any, constraints on governments, and Tamanaha notes
that “no Western legal theorist identifies the rule of law entirely in terms of rule by
law”.57 Moving along the sliding scale, formal legality requires laws to satisfy certain
minimum requirements in order to be regarded as compliant with the rule of law.
This conception of the thin rule of law is often associated with the writings of Joseph
Raz,58 who theorized that the doctrine requires laws to be prospective, general, clear,
public and relatively stable, and enforceable by an independent judiciary in open and
fair hearings.59 Finally, the thickest version of the formal conception of the rule of
law adds to formal legality the requirement that the legal system must be one that
embraces democracy, in the sense that laws are enacted by legislators who have been
freely chosen by the people.60
Where substantive theories of the rule of law are concerned, the thin version
requires the elements of the formal conception to be satisfied, along with compliance
with individual rights. Ronald Dworkin, for example, defines what he terms the
‘rights conception’ of the rule of law as follows:61
It assumes that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one another,
and political rights against the state as a whole. It insists that these moral and
political rights be recognized in positive law, so that they may be enforced upon
the demand of individual citizens through courts or other judicial institutions of
the familiar type, so far as this is practicable. The rule of law on this conception
is the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception of individual rights. It does
not distinguish, as the rule book conception does, between the rule of law and
substantive justice; on the contrary it requires, as part of the ideal of law, that the
rules in the book capture and enforce moral rights.
55 Compare Tamanaha, ibid. at 115.
56 Tamanaha, ibid., c.7 at 92.
57 Ibid.
58 Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue” (1977) 93 Law Q. Rev. 195.
59 Tamanaha, supra note 53, c. 7 at 93.
60 Ibid. at 99, 100.
61 Ronald Dworkin, “Political Judges and the Rule of Law” (1978) 64 Proceedings of the British Academy
259 at 262 [emphasis in original], cited in Tamanaha, supra note 53, c. 8 at 102.
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Dworkin recognized one of the main difficulties of a substantive conception of the
rule of law: there are often differences of opinion over the moral rights that people
possess.62 Though Dworkin took the view that a controlling principle is usually
evident, Tamanaha is more sceptical:63
There is no uncontroversial way to determine what these [i.e., individual] rights
entail. All general ideals—like equality, liberty, privacy, the right to property, the
freedom of contract, freedom from cruel punishment—are contestable in meaning
and reach. In particular contexts of application conflicts between rights can arise.
And no right is absolute, so consideration of social interests must always be
involved, which cannot be answered through consideration of the right alone.
Another difficulty is that if we assume—as Dworkin does—that the resolution of the
issue stated in the preceding paragraph should be dealt with in the judicial rather
than the political arena, this may have anti-democratic implications.64
A version of a substantive conception of the rule of law that is of intermediate
thickness requires formal legality, individual rights and democracy to be upheld.
This theory of the rule of law is evident in the writings of T.R.S. Allan, who has
said that the rule of law not only “encompasses traditional ideas about individ-
ual liberty and natural justice, and, more generally, ideas about the requirements
of justice and fairness in the relations between government and governed”, but is
also “inextricably linked with certain basic institutional arrangements. The funda-
mental notion of equality, which lies close to the heart of our convictions about
justice and fairness, demands an equal voice for all adult citizens in the legislative
process; universal suffrage may today be taken to be a central strand of the rule
of law.”65
The thickest form of the substantive theory of the rule of law requires recognition
of all the elements of the intermediate version, plus social welfare rights. Thus, if this
form of the rule of law is accepted, the government has an affirmative duty to ensure
distributive justice for the people. Tamanaha expresses the opinion that this version
of the rule of law causes “severe difficulties”. As with individual rights, views as
to what social welfare rights are may differ, and clashes between individual rights
and social welfare rights may arise. The rule of law becomes a “proxy battleground
for a dispute about broader societal issues, detracting from a fuller consideration of
those issues on their own terms, and in the process emptying the rule of law of any
distinctive meaning”.66
Pinning down the most appropriate meaning of the rule of law is difficult, but it is
a necessary task. First, as noted earlier, the courts may be called upon to determine
whether executive and legislative acts comply with the doctrine, or may need, of their
own accord, to base their reasoning on the doctrine. They cannot do so unless they
articulate what the doctrine means. Secondly, the government and its critics often
62 Dworkin, ibid. at 263, 264.
63 Tamanaha, supra note 53, c. 8 at 103, 104.
64 Ibid. at 104–110.
65 T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993) at 21, 22, cited in Tamanaha, ibid. at 110, 111.
66 Tamanaha, ibid. at 112, 113.
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rely upon the rule of law in aid of the positions they take on government policies and
statutes. No profitable dialogue can take place unless there is some agreement on
the implications of the doctrine.
II. Rule of Law Discourse in Singapore
Bearing in mind the typology of possible meanings of the rule of law described above,
this part of the article considers how critics have employed the doctrine in support of
their arguments, and attempts to identify the conception or conceptions of the rule
of law adopted. To set the context, we begin with a narration of some key incidents
that have led to some government policies being criticized from within and without
the country.
A. Incidents Giving Rise to Criticism
1. Detentions Under the Internal Security Act
Two series of incidents in Singapore give rise to many of the allegations that the
Government of Singapore has acted in breach of the rule of law. The first relates
to detentions made by the Government under the Internal Security Act,67 and the
second to decisions by various Cabinet ministers and PAP Members of Parliament
(“MPs”) to sue opposition politicians for defamation.
On 21 May 1987, 15 persons were arrested by the Internal Security Department of
the Ministry of Home Affairs during Operation Spectrum. In particular, in June and
July 1987 four of the arrested persons—Chng Suan Tze, Kevin de Souza, Teo Soh
Lung and Wong Souk Yee—were served with detention orders pursuant to s. 8(1)
of the ISA.68 This provision states that “[i]f the President is satisfied with respect to
any person that, with a view to preventing that person from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the security of Singapore or any part thereof or to the maintenance of
public order or essential services therein, it is necessary to do so”, the Minister shall
make an order, among other things, directing that the person be detained for any
period not exceeding two years. The statement setting out the grounds of detention
which was served on one of the detainees, Teo Soh Lung, gives a flavour of the
allegations against them. It says that she had been detained for acting “in a manner
prejudicial to the security of Singapore by being involved in a Marxist conspiracy
to subvert the existing social and political system in Singapore, using communist
united front tactics, with a view to establishing a Marxist state”.69 Subsequently,
67 ISA, supra note 7.
68 Chng Suan Tze, supra note 38 at paras. 2, 3. These four detainees are significant as they were the
appellants in this landmark court case.
69 Ibid. at para. 4. An academic and a number of the former detainees have disputed the Government’s
grounds for detention: see Michael D. Barr, “Marxists in Singapore? Lee Kuan Yew’s Campaign
against Catholic Social Justice Activists in the 1980s” (2010) 42:3 Critical Asian Studies 335; Teo Soh
Lung, Beyond the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Strategic
Information and Research Development Centre, 2010); Fong Hoe Fang, ed., That We May Dream
Again, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2012); Teo Soh Lung & Low Yit Leng, eds., Escape from the
Lion’s Paw: Reflections of Singapore’s Political Exiles (Singapore: Function 8, 2012); Tan Wah Piow,
Smokescreens & Mirrors: Tracing the “Marxist Conspiracy” (Singapore: Function 8, 2012).
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on 26 September 1987, the Minister for Home Affairs exercised powers granted to
him by s. 10(1) of the ISA70 to suspend the detention orders against Chng, de Souza,
Teo, Wong and three other detainees since he was “satisfied that they are unlikely
to resume subversive activities and no longer pose a security threat”. The detainees
were required to execute bonds and to comply with three conditions: they were not
to travel outside Singapore, take up membership in any society, or be involved in
activities propagating Communism or Marxism.71
However, about seven months later on 18 April 1988, Chng, de Souza, Teo, Wong
and five more detainees issued a joint media statement denying they were Marxist
conspirators. In addition they claimed that, among other things, statements they had
given to the authorities while detained had been induced by threats, and that they had
been ill-treated and even tortured. The HomeAffairs Minister responded the next day
by revoking the suspension orders and rearresting eight of the signatories to the joint
statement. (The remaining signatory had left Singapore.)72 The periods of detention
of Chng, de Souza, Teo and Wong were later extended.73 Having unsuccessfully
challenged the legality of their detention by way of habeas corpus before the High
Court, the four appealed to the Court of Appeal.
In Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs,74 the Court of Appeal found
in favour of the appellants on a narrow point. It held that the Government had not
provided sufficient evidence of the President’s satisfaction that detention of the appel-
lants was necessary to prevent them from acting in a manner prejudicial to national
security. The formal recitals in the detention orders expressing the President’s sat-
isfaction were insufficient as they amounted to hearsay; the orders had been signed
by the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The court could only
presume the existence of the President’s satisfaction, applying the doctrine omnia
esse rite acta (i.e., everything is presumed to have been correctly performed unless
the contrary is shown), if there was evidence that the Cabinet or the Home Affairs
Minister was satisfied that the appellants posed a threat to national security, and that
the President was similarly satisfied after having been advised on the matter by Cabi-
net or the Minister. Such evidence had to originate from Cabinet itself, the Secretary
to the Cabinet, or the Minister. For the same reason, an affidavit from the Permanent
Secretary stating that the “government” was satisfied was insufficient evidence of
the President’s satisfaction.75
70 ISA, supra note 7, s. 10(1): “At any time after an order has been made in respect of any person under
section 8(1)(a) the Minister may direct that the operation of such order be suspended subject to the
execution of a bond and to such conditions… as the Minister sees fit; and the Minister may revoke any
such direction if he is satisfied that the person against whom the order was made has failed to observe any
condition so imposed or that it is necessary in the public interest that such direction should be revoked.”
71 Chng Suan Tze, supra note 38 at para. 15.
72 Ibid. at paras. 16, 17.
73 Ibid. at para. 23.
74 Supra note 38. For commentary on this case, see Michael F. Rutter, “The Future for the Common Law”
in The Applicable Law in Singapore and Malaysia (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal, 1989) 574 at
588–611; Sin Boon Ann, “Judges and Administrative Discretion: A Look at Chng Suan Tze v. Minister
of Home Affairs” [1989] 2 M.L.J. ci. See also H. F. Rawlings, “Habeas Corpus and Preventive Detention
in Singapore and Malaysia” (1983) 25 Mal. L. Rev. 324; Tan Yock Lin, “Some Aspects of Executive
Detention in Malaysia and Singapore” (1987) 29 Mal. L. Rev. 237.
75 Ibid. paras. 31–42.
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Chng Suan Tze is regarded as a landmark decision, though, for a lengthy obiter
dictum about the reviewability of detentions under the ISA. In a decision dated 13
July 1971 entitled Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs,76 Chief Justice Wee
Chong Jin, sitting as a High Court judge, had held that the President’s state of mind
upon being advised by Cabinet on ISA detentions is a “purely subjective condition
so as to exclude a judicial enquiry into the sufficiency of the grounds to justify the
detention”.77 Wee C.J. relied upon the Malaysian Federal Court decision Karam
Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri (Minister of Home Affairs), Malaysia,78
which had arrived at the same result with respect to the Internal Security Act 1960 of
Malaysia,79 the relevant provisions of which are in pari materia with the ISA. Karam
Singh had itself followed the majority decisions of the House of Lords in Liversidge
v. Anderson80 and Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs.81 Further, Wee
C.J. held in Lee Mau Seng that the court could not even consider if the President had
acted mala fides, that is:82
[W]ithout exercising care, caution and a sense of responsibility and in a casual
and cavalier manner or on vague, irrelevant or incorrect grounds and facts so that
his subjective satisfaction with respect to the applicant was not “with a view to
preventing the applicant from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of
Singapore, etc” but for a different purpose altogether.
This was because “the logical result… would be that a court can substitute its own
[judgment] for the subjective satisfaction of the President acting in accordance with
the advice of the Cabinet”.83
Delivering the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Chng Suan Tze 17 years later, Wee
C.J. reviewed case law developments since Liversidge and Greene, and noted that
the House of Lords,84 the Privy Council85 and other Commonwealth courts86 had
determined that the majority decisions in those cases were wrong. Thus, the discre-
tion of the President under the ISA, acting on Cabinet’s advice, was not subjective
as Lee Mau Seng had held. Rather, the court could conduct an objective review
76 Supra note 40. For commentary on this case, see Rowena Daw, “Preventive Detention in Singapore—A
Comment on Lee Mau Seng” (1972) 14 Mal. L. Rev. 276.
77 Daw, ibid. at para. 54.
78 [1969] 2 M.L.J. 129 (Malaysia F.C.), cited in Lee Mau Seng, ibid. at para. 53 [Karam Singh].
79 No. 18 of 1960, now Act No. 82 (2006 Reprint).
80 [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L.) [Liversidge].
81 [1942] A.C. 284 (H.L.) [Greene].
82 Lee Mau Seng, supra note 40 at para. 58.
83 Ibid. at para. 60.
84 Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rossminster Ltd [1980] A.C. 952 at 1011, Lord Diplock, and at 1025,
Lord Scarman, and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khawaja [1984] A.C. 74
at 110, Lord Scarman, both cited in Chng Suan Tze, supra note 38 at paras. 61–63.
85 Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. de. S. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66 (P.C.) (on appeal from Ceylon), Attorney General
of Saint Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla v. John Joseph Reynolds [1980] A.C. 637 (P.C.) (on appeal
from the West Indies Associated States), and Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor [1980] A.C. 458 (P.C.)
(on appeal from Malaysia), respectively cited in Chng Suan Tze, supra note 38 at paras. 60, 74–78, and
84, 85.
86 For instance, Minister of Home Affairs v. Austin (1987) L.R.C. (Const.) 567 (Zimbabwe S.C.), and
Katofa v. Administrator-General for South West Africa 1985 (4) S.A. 211 (South West Africa S.C.),
cited in Chng Suan Tze, supra note 38 at paras. 71–73.
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of the exercise of the discretion.87 In addition, the Court of Appeal accepted the
appellants’ argument that the subjective test violated art. 12(1) and 93 of the Consti-
tution. Article 12(1) guarantees to all persons the right to equality before the law and
equal protection of the law, while art. 93 vests the judicial power of Singapore “in
a Supreme Court and in such subordinate courts as may be provided by any written
law for the time being in force”. The Court agreed that if the subjective test applied
to ss. 8 and 10 of the ISA and prevented decisions made pursuant to these provisions
from being reviewed by the court, they would be contrary to art. 12(1) which pro-
hibits laws that are arbitrary.88 Conversely, the objective test was consistent with
both art. 12(1) and 93.89 To date, Chng Suan Tze remains one of only two cases
reported since Singapore’s independence in 1965 in which a court has determined
that statutory provisions contravene the Constitution.90
Finally, as noted previously, the Court of Appeal relied upon the rule of law
doctrine to support its opinion that the subjective test was incorrect in law. It said:91
In our view, the notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion is contrary to the
rule of law. All power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts
should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power. If therefore the
Executive in exercising its discretion under an Act of Parliament has exceeded the
four corners within which Parliament has decided it can exercise its discretion,
such an exercise of discretion would be ultra vires the Act and a court of law must
be able to hold it to be so.
As an aside, it may be noted that the Court did not have to take a substantive view
of the rule of law. It was sufficient for it to emphasize the point that the rule of law
presupposes the existence of judicial review of primary and subsidiary legislation
by an independent judiciary, which is a feature of a formal conception of the rule of
law.92
The Court’s judgment in Chng Suan Tze was handed down on 8 December 1988.
At about 4:40 pm that day, an order for Teo’s release was served on the officer in
charge of Whitley Road Centre where she was being detained. She was released at
about 4:45 pm, placed in a car, driven a few hundred metres out of the gate, then
served with a fresh detention order for the period 8 December 1988 to 19 June 1989
and rearrested.93 She applied for habeas corpus five days later, on 13 December.
Three days after that, the Government introduced two bills into Parliament seeking
to amend the Constitution and to insert fresh provisions into the ISA. The bills were
87 Chng Suan Tze, supra note 38 at paras. 70, 139 (sub-para (f)).
88 Chng Suan Tze, supra note 38 at para. 82.
89 Ibid. at para. 86.
90 However, as the views expressed were obiter dicta, the Court of Appeal did not in fact declare the
statutory provisions to be void. The other case was Taw Cheng Kong (H.C.), supra note 28, in which
the High Court held that s. 37(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap. 241, 1993 Rev. Ed. Sing.)
discriminated against Singapore citizens and was thus incompatible with art. 12(1) of the Constitution.
This ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeal in Taw Cheng Kong (C.A.), supra note 29, in an
application for a criminal reference by the Public Prosecutor.
91 Chng Suan Tze, supra note 38 at para. 86.
92 See e.g., Raz, supra note 58 at 200, 201.
93 Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs [1989] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 461 at para. 4 (H.C.) [Teo Soh Lung
(H.C.)].
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debated in Parliament on 25 January 1989 and passed on the same day.94 The Act
amending the Constitution came into force on 27 January,95 and the ISA amendment
Act on 30 January.96
Four new provisions were added to the ISA. The operative provision was section
8B, which read as follows:
8B.— (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the law governing the judicial
review of any decision made or act done in pursuance of any power conferred upon
the President or the Minister by the provisions of this Act shall be the same as was
applicable and declared in Singapore on the 13th day of July 1971; and no part of
the law before, on or after that date of any other country in the Commonwealth
relating to judicial review shall apply.
(2) There shall be no judicial review in any court of any act done or decision made
by the President or the Minister under the provisions of this Act save in regard to
any question relating to compliance with any procedural requirement of this Act
governing such act or decision.
Section 8B(1) sought to turn the clock back by freezing the law pertaining to judicial
review of decisions made or actions taken under the ISA as at the date when Lee Mau
Seng was decided by the High Court. For good measure, judicial review was excluded
by the ouster clause in s. 8B(2). Section 8A was an interpretation section, while
s. 8C removed the right to appeal to the Privy Council.97 Section 8D made the other
sections applicable to “any proceedings instituted by way of judicial review of any
decision made or act done under the provisions of this Act, whether such proceedings
have been instituted before or after the commencement” of the amending Act. The
latter provision had the effect of retrospectively imposing the new ISA sections on
Teo’s habeas corpus application made in December 1988.
The constitutional amendments related to art. 149, which is the provision autho-
rizing the enactment of the ISA. Entitled “Legislation against subversion”, prior to
the amendment, art. 149(1) stated that if an Act recited that “action has been taken
or threatened by any substantial body of persons” for various purposes, including
action “which is prejudicial to the security of Singapore”, then “any provision of
that law designed to stop or prevent that action is valid notwithstanding that it is
inconsistent with Article 9, 13 or 14, or would, apart from this Article, be outside
the legislative power of Parliament”. The 1989 amendments added art. 11 and 12
to the list of fundamental liberties against which the ISA was immunized, modified
the wording of art. 149(1), and tacked on a new art. 149(3) to protect ss. 8A to 8D
94 Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs [1990] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 347 at para. 3 (C.A.) [Teo Soh Lung
(C.A.)].
95 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 1989 (No. 1 of 1989) (except for an amend-
ment to art. 94(3) dealing with the appointment of judges, which was deemed to have come into effect
on 19 November 1971).
96 Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989 (No. 2 of 1989).
97 Appeals to the Privy Council in all cases were eventually abolished in 1994 by the Supreme Court of
Judicature (Amendment) Act 1993 (No. 16 of 1993) (for commentary, see Tan Yock Lin, “Legislation
Comment: Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1993” [1993] Sing J.L.S. 557), the Consti-
tution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 1993 (No. 17 of 1993) and the Judicial Committee
(Repeal) Act 1994 (No. 2 of 1994).
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of the ISA.98 Like the amendments to the ISA, the constitutional amendments were
intended to reverse the effect of Chng Suan Tze.
Teo unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the ISA amendments before the
High Court and Court of Appeal.99 Before the High Court, it was argued on Teo’s
behalf that the ISA amendments contravened the rule of law because they authorized
arbitrary acts and decisions by the Government.100 This submission was rejected,
the Court taking the view that the amendments merely reaffirmed the legal position
taken in Lee Mau Seng, and could not be regarded as “usurping judicial power or
being contrary to the rule of law”:101
There is no abrogation of judicial power. It is erroneous to contend that the
rule of law has been abolished by legislation and that Parliament has stated its
absolute and conclusive judgment in applications for judicial review or other
actions. Parliament has done no more than to enact the rule of law relating to
the law applicable to judicial review. The legislation does not direct the court
to enter a particular judgment or dismiss a particular case. The court is left to
deal with the case on the basis of the amendments. Legislation designed against
subversion must necessarily include provisions to ensure the effectiveness of
preventive detention. The amendments are intended to do just that.
The High Court thus appeared to adopt what Tamanaha calls ‘rule by law’, the thinnest
form of the formal conception of the rule of law. Since Parliament had validly passed
the 1989 amendments, the Court would not impugn the legislation for failing to
98 The constitutional amendments extended the effect of art. 149(1) “to any amendment to that law [i.e., a
law enacted pursuant to art. 149(1)] or any provision in any law enacted under the provisions of clause
(3)”. Article 149(3) states:
If, in respect of any proceedings whether instituted before or after the commencement of this
clause, any question arises in any court as to the validity of any decision made or act done in
pursuance of any power conferred upon the President or the Minister by any law referred to in
this Article, such question shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of any law as
may be enacted by Parliament for this purpose; and nothing in Article 93 shall invalidate any law
enacted pursuant to this clause.
99 Teo Soh Lung (H.C.), supra note 93; Teo Soh Lung (C.A.), supra note 94. Another detainee, Vincent
Cheng, also made an application with a similar lack of success: Cheng Vincent v. Minister for Home
Affairs [1990] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 38 (H.C.). For further commentary on the Teo Soh Lung cases, seeYee Chee
Wai, Ho Tze Wei Monica & Seng Kiat Boon Daniel, “Judicial Review of Preventive Detention under
the Internal Security Act—A Summary of Developments” (1989) 10 Sing. L. Rev. 66; Tham Chee Ho,
“Judiciary under Siege?” (1992) 13 Sing. L. Rev. 60 at 73–83;Yeong Sien Seu, “Clarity or Controversy—
The Meaning of Judicial Independence in Malaysia and Singapore” (1992) 13 Sing. L. Rev. 85 at
100–107; Michael Hor, “Terrorism and the Criminal Law: Singapore’s Solution” [2002] Sing. J.L.S. 30;
Michael Hor, “Law and Terror: Singapore Stories and Malaysian Dilemmas” in Victor V. Ramraj,
Michael Hor & Kent Roach, eds., Global Anti-terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005) 273; Michael Hor, “Constitutionalism and subversion: An exploration” in Li-ann
Thio & KevinY.L. Tan, eds., Evolution of a Revolution: Forty Years of the Singapore Constitution (New
York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 260; Eunice Chua, “Reactions to Indefinite Preventive Detention:
An Analysis of how the Singapore, United Kingdom and American Judiciary Give Voice to the Law in
the Face of (Counter) Terrorism” (2007) 25 Sing. L. Rev. 3; Yang Ziliang, “Preventive Detention as a
Counter-terrorism Strategy: They Have Stopped Using It and So Should We” (2007) 25 Sing. L. Rev. 24;
Thio Li-ann, “Constitutional Supremacy” in A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law (Singapore:
Academy Publishing, 2012) at paras. 04.084–04.104 [Thio, Treatise].
100 Teo Soh Lung (H.C.), supra note 93 at para. 27.
101 Ibid. at para. 48 [emphasis added].
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comply with other requirements often associated with the rule of law, such as effective
judicial review or compliance with human rights standards. The Court of Appeal did
not refer to the rule of law, but affirmed that it could not consider whether there were
objective grounds for Teo’s detention as Parliament had effectively reapplied the
subjective test to the exercise of executive discretion under the ISA.102 Nonetheless,
the Court left the door slightly ajar by suggesting that it has a responsibility to decide
whether the President or Minister’s satisfaction is in fact based on matters within the
scope of ss. 8 and 10 of the ISA.103
2. Defamation Suits Brought Against Opposition Politicians
The second series of incidents frequently relied upon as evidence that the Government
fails to comply with the rule of law concern Cabinet members and other PAP MPs
bringing defamation suits against opposition politicians. Such suits arguably have a
chilling effect on political speech, particularly since they often relate to statements
made during election campaigns, or concerning political issues.104 Moreover, a
successful suit that leads a large sum of damages being awarded to the plaintiff which
the defendant cannot afford to pay can result in the defendant losing a parliamentary
seat or being prevented from participating in elections. Under the Constitution, a
person is not qualified to be an MP (or, as a matter of fact, to be elected as President)
if he or she is an undischarged bankrupt,105 and becoming bankrupt triggers the
vacation of a parliamentary seat.106
One of the earlier reported actions was taken by the then Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew against Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam, the leader of the Workers’ Party of
Singapore (“WP”). It was claimed that during a rally for the 1976 general election,
Jeyaretnam had insinuated that Lee had abused his office to obtain financial advantage
for himself, his wife and his brother, and that he also lacked honesty and integrity
and was thus unfit to hold the office of Prime Minister.107 The High Court found
in favour of the Prime Minister and awarded damages of $130,000. The judgment
102 Teo Soh Lung (C.A.), supra note 94 at paras. 19–21.
103
“Lord Alexander’s submission on the law as declared in Lee Mau Seng is thus an argument which is
available to the appellant only if the evidence in fact demonstrates that she was redetained for purposes
which had nothing to do with national security”: ibid. at para. 27.
104 For commentary, see Thio Li-ann, “Singapore: Regulating Political Speech and the Commitment ‘to
Build a Democratic Society”’(2003) 1 Int’l. J. Const. L. 516; Tey Tsun Hang, “Singapore’s Jurisprudence
of Political Defamation and its Triple-Whammy Impact on Political Speech” [2008] P.L. 452; Thio
Li-ann, “The Virtual and the Real: Article 14, Political Speech and the Calibrated Management of
Deliberative Democracy in Singapore” [2008] Sing. J.L.S. 25; Cameron Sim, “The Singapore Chill:
Political Defamation and the Normalization of a Statist Rule of Law” (2011) 20 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y
J. 319; Thio Li-ann, “Freedom of Speech, Assembly and Association” in Thio, Treatise, supra note 99,
747 at paras. 14.128–14.192.
105 Singapore Constitution, supra note 6, art. 45(1)(b), made applicable to the President by art. 19(2)(d).
106 Article 46(2)(e) of the Singapore Constitution states that a MP’s parliamentary seat becomes vacant “if
he becomes subject to any of the disqualifications specified in Article 45”. No corresponding provision
applies to the President, who may only be removed from office in accordance with the procedure laid
down by art. 22L for mental or physical infirmity, intentional violation of the Singapore Constitution,
treason, misconduct or corruption involving the abuse of the powers of the office, or any offence involving
fraud, dishonesty or moral turpitude.
107 Lee Kuan Yew v. Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1979–1980] S.L.R.(R.) 24 at para. 20 (H.C.).
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was upheld on appeal.108 This signalled the start of a trend in which elections were
characterized by defamation suits brought by candidates in respect of remarks made
by their political opponents during the hustings.
Shortly before the Anson by-election of 1981, Jeyaretnam attended the inaugu-
ration of the Singapore Democratic Party (“SDP”) and delivered a speech. He was
received rapturously by the audience, and when he had to leave early for another
engagement a large number of people also left. Not long thereafter, the by-election
was called and Jeyaretnam was nominated as the WP’s candidate. Goh Chok Tong,
then the Minister for Defence and Second Minister for Health, and First Organizing
Secretary of the PAP, gave a press conference at which he said that the “exodus” from
the SDP inauguration had been “contrived” by Jeyaretnam “to show who is boss at
this stage”.109 Jeyaretnam sued Goh, contending that the remarks suggested that he
was:110
[A]n opportunist, a man of base and dishonourable motives, seeking only to
promote himself, to gain power for himself, and had shown by his conduct that he
was not genuinely sincere in building up a credible and constructive opposition
in Parliament but out solely to seek his own glory and was accordingly unfit to
hold the office of a Member of Parliament.
The High Court found that although Goh’s words were defamatory, Jeyaretnam had
failed to establish that he had been disparaged in his office as WP Secretary-General.
Furthermore, Goh had made out a defence of fair comment. The holding was upheld
on appeal to the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council.111 Jeyaretnam was elected
to Parliament for the Anson constituency in the 1981 by-election, breaking the PAP’s
monopoly that had existed since 1968.
In the 1984 general election that followed, Seow Khee Leng, who was Secretary-
General of the Singapore United Front, admitted to having defamed Lee Kuan Yew
during a rally. Damages were assessed at $250,000 for the “very serious slander”
which had alleged corruption on the Prime Minister’s part.112
Jeyaretnam lost his parliamentary seat with effect from 10 November 1986113
following a conviction for having made a false declaration concerning the WP’s finan-
cial accounts, an offence under s. 199 of the Penal Code,114 for which a one-month
imprisonment and a $5,000 fine had been imposed.115 Under art. 45(1)(e) of the
108 Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [1979–1980] S.L.R.(R.) 255 (C.A.).
109 Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Goh Chok Tong [1983–1984] S.L.R.(R.) 745 at para. 6 (H.C.).
110 Ibid. at para. 7.
111 Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Goh Chok Tong [1985–1986] S.L.R.(R.) 856 (C.A.), aff’d [1989]
2 S.L.R.(R.) 130 (P.C.).
112 Lee Kuan Yew v. Seow Khee Leng [1988] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 252 at paras. 3, 41 (H.C.).
113 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 48, cols. 833, 834 (9 December 1986) (Yeoh Ghim Seng, Speaker).
114 Cap. 224, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing. (now the 2008 Rev. Ed.).
115 Jeyaretnam and Wong Hong Toy, the Chairman of the WP, had been tried and convicted by a District
Court and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment each. On appeal to the High Court, the sentences
were initially reduced to an imprisonment term of one month and a fine of $10,000 each (with a further
jail term of one month in default of payment): Wong Hong Toy v. Public Prosecutor [1985–1986]
S.L.R.(R.) 1049 at paras. 5, 53 (H.C.). However, when it was brought to the judge’s attention that at
the time the appellants were convicted by the District Court it could only impose a fine of up to $5,000,
their fines were reduced to $5,000 each: Wong Hong Toy v. Public Prosecutor [1987] S.L.R.(R.) 213
at paras. 6-8 (C.A.). The alteration of the fine was effected pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code
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Singapore Constitution, a person is not qualified to be an MP if he or she:
has been convicted of an offence by a court of law in Singapore or Malaysia and
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year or to a fine of not
less than $2,000 and has not received a free pardon.
Though the law provided no avenue for appealing the judgment to the Court of
Appeal or the Privy Council, when Jeyaretnam appealed to the Judicial Committee
his striking off from the roll of advocates and solicitors based on the false declaration
conviction and a related 1985 conviction for fraudulently dealing with cheques,116
their Lordships allowed the appeal and “record[ed] their deep disquiet that by a series
of misjudgments the appellant and his co-accused Wong have suffered a grievous
injustice. They have been fined, imprisoned and publicly disgraced for offences of
which they were not guilty.”117 Commenting on the judgment in Parliament on 19
January 1989, the Minister for Law, relying on the Attorney-General’s advice,118
noted that the Privy Council’s remarks were not binding on the Government. By not
inviting the Public Prosecutor to make submissions on Jeyaretnam’s convictions, the
Privy Council had “violated a basic rule of natural justice: that a court should not
reach a decision without hearing both sides of an argument”.119 In the Government’s
view, Jeyaretnam had been correctly convicted and there had been no miscarriage of
justice.120
Jeyaretnam was not qualified to stand for Parliament for five years from the dates
of his convictions,121 and thus did not participate in the 1988 and 1991 general
elections. Another suit by the Prime Minister against Jeyaretnam in the wake of
the 1988 general election required the courts to consider the compatibility of the
existing law of defamation with the right to freedom of speech and expression guar-
anteed by art. 14(1)(a) of the Constitution. Campaigning for the WP, Jeyaretnam
had averred that Lee had advised Teh Cheang Wan, the Minister for National Devel-
opment, to commit suicide to avoid being investigated for alleged corruption. The
Court of Appeal declined to adopt a public figure defence along the lines of NewYork
Times v. Sullivan122 and Lingens v. Austria,123 and affirmed the constitutionality
(Cap. 68, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing.), s. 217(2): “A clerical error may be rectified at any time and any other
mistake may be rectified at any time before the court rises for the day.” The equivalent provision in the
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 68, 2012 Rev. Ed. Sing.), which is worded differently, is s. 301.
116 Jeyaretnam and Wong Hong Toy were convicted by the High Court for having a common intention
to fraudulently deliver to third parties without adequate consideration to a judgment creditor three
cheques which were the WP’s property, knowing it to be likely that this would prevent the distribution
of property to the judgment creditor, an offence under s. 421 of the Penal Code read with s. 34. They
were fined $3,000 each ($1,000 for each cheque), and three weeks’ imprisonment if they defaulted in
paying the fines: Public Prosecutor v. Wong Hong Toy [1985–1986] S.L.R.(R.) 126 (H.C.). The High
Court overturned their acquittal on the charges by the District Court.
117 Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Law Society of Singapore [1988] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 470 at para. 59 (P.C.) (on
appeal from Singapore).
118 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 52, cols. 361–364 (19 January 1989) (Tan Boon Teik, Attorney-
General), “Advice of the Attorney-General on the Judicial Committee’s Judgment in Privy Council
Appeal No. 10 of 1988—Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v. The Law Society of Singapore”).
119 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 52, col. 278 (19 January 1989) (S. Jayakumar, Minister for Law).
120 Ibid. at cols. 277–280.
121 Singapore Constitution, art. 45(2).
122 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
123 (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407.
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of the existing law.124 It affirmed125 the High Court’s award of damages of
$260,000.126
Though Jeyaretnam unsuccessfully contested the 1997 general election, as one of
the ‘best losers’ he became a Non-constituency Member of Parliament (“NCMP”).
The 1997 election witnessed defamation suits by Goh Chok Tong, now Prime Min-
ister and Secretary-General of the PAP, Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong,
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and other PAP MPs against Jeyaretnam and his run-
ning mate, Tang Liang Hong. Thirteen sets of proceedings were commenced by
the plaintiffs against Tang for various remarks he had made touching their fitness
to lead the country. In particular, Tang had implied that Goh, Lee Hsien Loong
and Lee Kuan Yew had given something to a property developer in exchange for
obtaining discounts when purchasing residential property. The defences filed by
Tang were struck out in 12 suits for non-compliance with court orders, and in the
suit brought by Goh for disclosing no defence.127 The High Court assessed the
total amount of damages payable by Tang to the plaintiffs at $8.075 million.128
This was reduced on appeal to $6.675 million.129 The actions against Jeyaretnam
stemmed from remarks he had made on the eve of polling day. Tang had been crit-
icized by the plaintiffs as anti-Christian and a Chinese chauvinist, and thus unfit to
be elected an MP. In remarks to the media, Tang said that he would be making a
police report as the MPs had been “telling lies”, “defaming” and “assassinating [his]
character”.130 On 1 January 1997, Tang made two police reports. At the election
rally at which Jeyaretnam was speaking, Tang went to the podium and placed some
documents in front of him. Just before concluding his speech, Jeyaretnam said:
“Mr. Tang Liang Hong has just placed before me two reports he has made to the
police against, you know, Mr. Goh Chok Tong and his people.” Where Goh’s suit
was concerned, the Court of Appeal accepted that the statement was defamatory in
that it implied that he had acted in a seriously wrong manner by attacking Tang and
that he would likely be subject to a police investigation, and awarded damages of
$100,000.131
Two defamation suits relating to articles that appeared in the WP’s official pub-
lication, The Hammer, were heard during Jeyaretnam’s second stint in Parliament.
The first related to an article critical of Tamil Language Week which appeared in the
August 1995 issue of The Hammer. The members of the organizing committee of
Tamil Language Week sued Jeyaretnam as editor of the newsletter, along with the
author of the article, the newsletter’s printer, and the WP itself. Ten of the plaintiffs
were found to have made out their claim, and Jeyaretnam, the article’s author and
124 Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 791 (C.A.). For commentary on this
case, see Michael Hor, “The Freedom of Speech and Defamation: Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee
Kuan Yew” [1992] Sing. J.L.S. 542.
125 Ibid. at paras. 84–87.
126 Lee Kuan Yew v. Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1990] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 709 at para. 61 (H.C.). For com-
mentary on this case, see Michael Hor & Collin Seah, “Selected Issues in the Freedom of Speech and
Expression in Singapore” (1991) 12 Sing. L. Rev. 296 at 311–318.
127 Goh Chok Tong v. Tang Liang Hong [1997] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 811 (H.C.).
128 Lee Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong [1997] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 81 (H.C.).
129 Tang Liang Hong v. Lee Kuan Yew [1997] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 576 (C.A.).
130 Goh Chok Tong v. Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1997] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 46 at para. 12 (H.C.).
131 Goh Chok Tong v. Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1998] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 971 (C.A.).
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the WP were jointly ordered to pay $55,000 to them.132 In 1996, Jeyaretnam and
fellow members of the WP’s executive council were sued by a group of PAP MPs,
including the Minister for Law and for Foreign Affairs, S. Jayakumar, in respect of
another article in The Hammer. The defendants admitted liability but the plaintiffs
nonetheless filed suit because the quantum of damages could not be agreed upon.133
The case was settled on 8 September 1997 the first day of a five-day hearing for the
assessment of damages, with the plaintiffs agreeing to accept damages and costs of
$200,000.134
In November 2000, Jeyaretnam agreed to pay the outstanding damages due to the
plaintiffs in the Tamil Language Week case in instalments, on condition that if he
failed to pay any instalment the plaintiffs were at liberty to proceed with bankruptcy
petitions against him and he would consent to being made a bankrupt.135 He made
the first two payments, but then defaulted on the third instalment. The plaintiffs
thus proceeded with their bankruptcy petitions against Jeyaretnam, and an order to
that effect was made against him on 19 January 2001 by an assistant registrar of
the High Court.136 The bankruptcy order was confirmed on appeal to a High Court
judge,137 and to the Court of Appeal.138 The submission that the agreement was
extortionate and, thus, the bankruptcy proceedings had been used as an “instrument
of oppression”,139 was rejected.140 As a result, Jeyaretnam lost his NCMP seat on
23 July 2001, the date his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal,141 and
was unable to contest the general election held later that year. Jeyaretnam failed in
his attempt to be discharged from bankruptcy in 2004 in order to participate in the
general election eventually held in 2006,142 and he was only granted a conditional
discharge by the Court of Appeal in 2007.143 In 2008 he established a new political
party, the Reform Party of Singapore, in preparation for the next election. However,
he died just over three months later, on 30 September 2008, aged 82.
Dr. Chee Soon Juan, Secretary-General of the SDP and an unsuccessful candidate
in the 2001 general election, was sued by Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong for
remarks he made during the campaigning period. Although Chee apologized to Lee
and Goh at an election rally and in two newspapers, and agreed to pay them damages
and costs, he resisted applications for interlocutory judgment to be entered against
132 Nirumalan K Pillay v. A Balakrishnan [1999] SGHC 4, aff’d Balakrishnan v. Nirumalan K Pillay [1999]
2 S.L.R.(R.) 462 (C.A.).
133 Shunmugam Jayakumar v. Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1996] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 658 (H.C.).
134 Ahmad Osman, “WP and 12 Members to Pay S$200,000 for Defaming MPs” The Straits Times
(9 September 1997).
135 Re Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin, ex parte Indra Krishnan [2001] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 415 at para. 2 (H.C.) [Ex
parte Indra Krishnan (H.C.)].
136 Ibid. at paras. 5–7.
137 Ex parte Indra Krishnan (H.C.), supra note 135.
138 Re Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin, ex parte Indra Krishnan [2001] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 733 (C.A.).
139 Re Majory, a Debtor [1955] Ch. 600 at 624, cited in Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Indra Krishnan
[2005] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 395 (C.A.) at para. 25 [JBJ v. Indra Krishnan].
140 JBJ v. Indra Krishnan, ibid. at paras. 25–30.
141 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 73, cols. 1822, 1823 (25 July 2011) (Tan Soo Khoon, Speaker).
142 Re Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin, ex parte Indra Krishnan [2004] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 133 (H.C.); Jeyaretnam
Joshua Benjamin v. Indra Krishnan [2005] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 395 (C.A.).
143 Re Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin, ex parte Indra Krishnan [2007] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 433 (C.A.) at paras. 37,
38, rev’g [2007] SGHC 14 at paras. 33, 34. The condition was that Jeyaretnam had to pay 45% of the
outstanding debts.
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him. In his defence, among other things, he denied having made the remarks, and
that they had any defamatory effect even if they had been made. Subsequently, he
admitted to having made the remarks. Interlocutory judgments were granted by
the High Court,144 and damages assessed at $200,000 for Lee145 and $300,000 for
Goh.146 Due to his inability to pay the damages and costs, Chee was made a bankrupt
which disqualified him from contesting the general elections held in 2006 and 2011.
In 2012, Chee offered $30,000 to Lee and Goh in settlement of their claims, stating
that he wished to have his bankruptcy discharged in order to stand as a candidate in
the next general election which is due by 2016.147 On 11 September, the Official
Assignee informed Chee that Lee and Goh had accepted his offer.148
Chee and the SDP were also sued by Lee Hsien Loong, who had by this time
become the Prime Minister, and by Lee KuanYew, now Minister Mentor, over articles
published in the SDP newspaper The New Democrat around February 2006. The
High Court granted summary judgment in the plaintiffs’ favour on the basis that
passages in the articles were defamatory and the defendants had not adduced sufficient
facts to support the defences relied on.149 Damages were assessed in a separate
hearing at $330,000 for the Prime Minister and $280,000 for the Minister Mentor.150
To conclude this narration, it may be noted that over the past three decades suc-
cessful defamation proceedings have also been brought by Cabinet members against
the media, including the International Herald Tribune151 and the Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review.152 In a 2010 case involving the publisher of the latter magazine,
the Court of Appeal declined to hold that a defence of responsible journalism as
applied by the House of Lords in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd153 was part of
Singapore law.
B. Reliance on the Rule of Law by Critics
The existence and employment of the ISA and the bringing of defamation suits by
Cabinet members and PAP MPs against opposition politicians are frequently cited
by critics of Government policy as evidence of a failure to comply with the rule of
law, though these are by no means the only issues complained about.
Unsurprisingly, the most vocal critics based in Singapore are the opposition politi-
cians who have themselves been affected by measures taken by the Government or its
members. About two months after the Government brought into force amendments
to the Constitution and the ISA to reverse the legal effects of Chng Suan Tze, the
144 Lee KuanYew v. Chee Soon Juan [2003] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 8 (H.C.); Goh Chok Tong v. Chee Soon Juan [2003]
3 S.L.R.(R.) 32 (H.C.).
145 Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee Soon Juan [2005] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 552 (H.C.).
146 Goh Chok Tong v. Chee Soon Juan [2005] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 573 (H.C.).
147
“Chee Offers $30k to Clear Bankruptcy Case” The Straits Times (27 July 2012).
148 Tessa Wong, “Chee’s $30k Offer to Settle Bankruptcy Accepted: SDP” The Straits Times (12 September
2012).
149 Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party [2007] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 675 (H.C.).
150 Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party [2009] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 642 (H.C.).
151 Lee Kuan Yew v. Vinocur [1995] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 38 (H.C.).
152 Lee Kuan Yew v. Davies [1989] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 544 (H.C.); Review Publishing Co Ltd v. Lee Hsien Loong
[2010] 1 S.L.R. 52 (C.A.).
153 [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.), not applied in Review Publishing, supra note 152.
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European Committee for Human Rights in Malaysia and Singapore (KEHMA-S)
and the Rainbow Group of the European Parliament organized a conference on 9 and
10 March 1989 to discuss the rule of law and human rights in Malaysia and Singa-
pore. J. B. Jeyaretnam was among the participants. His presentation, subsequently
published in the conference report under the title “The Rule of Law in Singapore”,154
was a wide-ranging broadside which accused the Government of failing to uphold
various human rights. These included housing and labour rights; and the rights to
free speech and assembly which, he said, had been infringed by laws requiring news-
papers to be licensed and enabling the circulation of foreign serial publications to be
restricted, and by the requirement for permits in order to hold demonstrations and
rallies. He also criticized the existence of the ISA and the Criminal Law (Temporary
Provisions) Act (“CLTPA”).155 The latter statute empowers the Home Affairs Min-
ister to detain without trial a person who has been “associated with activities of a
criminal nature” if this is deemed necessary “in the interests of public safety, peace
and good order”.156
On 24 November 1999, Jeyaretnam, an NCMP at this time, returned to these
themes when he moved the following motion in the House: “That this House recog-
nises the importance of the Rule of Law and urges the government to ensure the
complete and full observance of the Rule of Law by all Ministers, officials and pub-
lic servants.”157 He traced the doctrine back to the Magna Carta158 and expressed
the view that “[i]t has become part of the Constitution”, particularly the part “which
enacts the fundamental liberties of the people”. He singled out art. 9 and 12, which
respectively protect rights to liberty and equality, as “the most important ones”.159
Jeyaretnam then alleged eight instances where, in his view, the Government had vio-
lated the rule of law. These included detentions without trial under the ISA and the
CLTPA; denial of the right to counsel; and denial of freedom of speech and assem-
bly, including freedom of the press.160 Chiam See Tong of the Singapore People’s
Party complained that the Government had not treated opposition parties and the
PAP equally as regards issuing licences for the holding of events.161 The claims by
the two opposition MPs that the Government had breached human rights standards
indicate that they had a substantive conception of the rule of law.
154 J. B. Jeyaretnam, “The Rule of Law in Singapore” in The Rule of Law and Human Rights in Malaysia and
Singapore: A Report of the Conference Held at the European Parliament, 9 & 10 March 1989 (Limelette,
Belgium: KEHMA-S, 1989), 30 [Rule of Law Conference]. See also Etienne Jaudel, “Assessment of
the State of Human Rights in Malaysia and Singapore from an International Perspective”, Rule of Law
Conference, 23 at 25, 28, expressing the view that the Internal Security Acts of the two countries are
“nothing more than an invitation to the arbitrary use of power”, and that “there is no freedom to hold
public rallies. There is no freedom of access to press or TV. There is no freedom to disseminate ideas
and information, meaning that the possibility of electoral success is severely limited.”
155 Cap. 67, 2000 Rev. Ed. Sing.
156 Ibid. s. 30(a).
157 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 71, col. 570 (24 November 1999) (J.B. Jeyaretnam, Non-constituency
Member of Parliament).
158 Ibid. at cols. 571, 572.
159 Ibid. at cols. 574, 575.
160 Supra note 157 at cols. 576–578.
161 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 71, cols. 582–584 (24 November 1999) (Chiam See Tong, Potong
Pasir SMC).
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In contrast, Ministers and PAP MPs who participated in the debate tended to rely
on the more formal conceptions of the doctrine. For instance, Ho Peng Kee, the
Minister of State for Law, expressed the view that the rule of law:162
[R]efers to the supremacy of law, as opposed to the arbitrary exercise of power.
The other key tenet is that everyone is equal before the law. The concept also
includes the notions of the transparency, openness and prospective application
of our laws, observation of the principles of natural justice, independence of the
Judiciary and judicial review of administrative action.
He said that these elements were “established features of our legal system”163 and
refuted Jeyaretnam’s contentions that the ISA and CLTPA breached the rule of law,
noting that there were safeguards such as advisory boards to confirm detentions, and
that the statutes had all been “done legally and carefully drafted by our Attorney-
General’s Chambers. And of course, all are subject to the requirements of the
Constitution and all coming to this House to be debated and passed [sic].”164
Chin Tet Yung, a PAP MP for Sembawang Group Representation Constituency,
said the rule of law required that:165
All laws are prospective, stable, properly and constitutionally enacted. The appli-
cation of laws, the making of legal orders by public officers should be guided
by clear and general rules, that is, avoiding any personal bias or favour, treating
equal cases equally, making decisions rationally and in the public interest, and
in accordance with the written laws of the land. … In this particular principle
where you have laws, obviously such laws must be applied and obviously the laws
are applied by public officers who make legal orders. If these legal orders are
substantiated by subsidiary legislation, if this subsidiary legislation is sanctioned
by parent Acts, by the primary legislation, then any order issuing from it would
be legitimate and would comply with the Rule of Law. And, if anyone is unhappy
with that, there is always the next aspect or principle of the Rule of Law, and that
is, that the judiciary has the power and the authority to review any administrative
action. So that is the third principle. The final principle… is that the judiciary
must be independent and the courts should be generally accessible to all who seek
recourse to them.
He moved an amendment to the motion introduced by Jeyaretnam so that it read:
“That this House (1) values the importance of the Rule of Law; and (2) commends
the Government for upholding the Rule of Law and ensuring that it is fully observed
by all.”166 The amendment motion was ultimately voted on and passed by a majority
of MPs in Parliament.167
162 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 71, col. 592 (24 November 1999) (Ho Peng Kee, Minister of State
for Law).
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid. at col. 594.
165 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 71, cols. 602, 603 (24 November 1999) (Chin TetYung, Sembawang
GRC).
166 Ibid. at cols 605, 606.
167 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 71, col. 634 (24 November 1999).
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Chee Soon Juan, in a chapter entitled “Rights and the Rule of Law” in his 1994
book Dare to Change,168 criticized the detention of persons by the Government under
the ISA following Operation Spectrum and on other occasions.169 He emphasized
the importance of rights to free speech and association, saying that:170
Singapore must be a home to Singaporeans, not a hotel and casino. For it to be
a home, Singaporeans must be given a say in how the country is run. For this to
happen, people must be free to organise themselves into useful groups which can
help society, groups that need not be political parties. These fundamental free-
doms of speech and association are beyond political rhetoric. They are essential
for our society’s progress.
He lamented the lack of these freedoms in Singapore, claiming that “the PAP Gov-
ernment has made it abundantly clear that it does not want participation of the people
in matters of interest to the nation” because the Government had “insist[ed] that all
who wish to say anything political must join a political party”.171
Chee spelled out his understanding of the rule of law in an open letter addressed to
the Chief Justice, theAttorney-General and the Minister for Law which was published
on the SDP website on 6 January 2009:172
[T]he rule of law is not just a system where the government passes legislation and
everyone unquestioningly obeys. The concept of the rule of law necessitates the
limitation of state power and the respect of human rights. Our Constitution spells
out what these limitations are. It also defines the rights of the citizen.
Subsequently, in a speech delivered to the International Bar Association Conference
in Dubai on 4 November 2011, he stated that the existence of free media and the
rights to free expression and peaceful assembly were essential elements of the rule
of law.173
Conceptions of the rule of law that require human rights protection also character-
ize the opinions of critics of Government policy based outside Singapore. An early
example is the 1990 report by the New York City Bar Association’s Committee on
International Human Rights entitled The Decline of the Rule of Law in Singapore
and Malaysia.174 The report claimed that “the rule of law in Singapore today has
168 Chee Soon Juan, Dare to Change: An Alternative Vision for Singapore (Singapore: Singapore
Democratic Party, 1994) at 137.
169 Ibid. at 139–146.
170 Ibid. at 148.
171 Ibid.
172 Chee Soon Juan, “Chee responds to CJ, AG and Law Minister” (6 January 2009), online: Singapore
Democratic Party <http://yoursdp.org/index.php/perspective/special-feature/1681-chee-responds-to-
cj-ag-and-law-minister> (last accessed: 28 March 2012; archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/
66VD0xg5J>).
173 Chee Soon Juan, “Text of Dr. Chee Soon Juan’s Speech at the International Bar Association Conference
in Dubai on 4 Nov 2011 (Presented via Video)” (4 November 2011), online: Singapore Democratic
Party <http: //classic3.yoursdp.org/index.php/perspective/special-feature/5046-text-of-chee-soon-
juans-speech-to-iba> (last accessed: 28 March 2012; archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/
66VCusHQp>). See also Chee Soon Juan, “The Media and Censorship” in Your Future, My Faith,
Our Freedom: A Democratic Blueprint for Singapore (Singapore: Open Singapore Centre, 2001) at
166; and Chee Soon Juan, Democratically Speaking (Singapore: Chee Soon Juan, 2012) at 145–236.
174 Decline in the Rule of Law, supra note 3.
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given way to empty legalism. In the British tradition, the Singapore government
scrupulously applies the law on the books. But that law no longer restrains govern-
ment actions or protects individual rights.”175 It alleged that “serious human rights
violations” had taken place in Singapore, which included “use of the Internal Secu-
rity Act to detain non-violent dissenters” and “restrictions on freedom of speech,
association, religion and the press”.176 In addition to expressing concern about the
Operation Spectrum detentions under the ISA,177 the report’s authors noted that Chia
Thye Poh, a former Barisan Socialis MP, was detained under the ISA between 1966
and 1989, and then permitted to live on Sentosa island with restrictions on his activ-
ities and movements.178 (All restrictions on him were finally lifted with effect from
27 November 1998.)179 The report concluded that the ISA contravened international
standards on administrative detention.180
Where other fundamental freedoms were concerned, the report highlighted the
existence of laws restricting the media such as the Broadcasting and Television Act181
and the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act.182 Under powers granted by the latter
statute,183 in 1986 and 1987 the Minister for Communications and Information cur-
tailed the circulation of Time magazine, the Asian Wall Street Journal and the Far
Eastern Economic Review for “engaging in the domestic politics of Singapore”.184
Moreover, Lee KuanYew successfully sued the Review for libel in 1987185 in an arti-
cle about the ISA detentions which occurred that year. A statement on the High Court
judgment by the president of Dow Jones & Co, owner of the Review, which was pub-
lished by Dow Jones’AsianWall Street Journal, led to a charge of contempt of court by
scandalizing the court.186 As regards the freedom of religion, the NewYork City Bar
Association’s report conveyed unease about a bill—now the Maintenance of Religious
Harmony Act187—that would permit the Minister for Home Affairs to bar religious
workers deemed subversive or threatening to religious harmony from addressing
175 Ibid. at 46.
176 Ibid. at 4, 5.
177 Ibid. at 57–70.
178 Ibid. at 70–73.
179
“Chia Thye Poh to be Allowed to Live in S’pore” The Straits Times (16 November 1992) at 37;
Muhammad Shah, “Chia Thye Poh a Free Man” The Straits Times (27 November 1998) at 2.
180 Decline in the Rule of Law, supra note 3 at 73–76.
181 Cap. 28, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing. Broadcasting is now governed by the Broadcasting Act (Cap. 28, 2012
Rev. Ed. Sing.).
182 Cap. 206, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing., now the 2002 Rev. Ed. Sing. [NPPA]. For commentary on press freedom
in Singapore, see Thio Li-ann, “Human Rights and the Media in Singapore” in Robert Haas, ed., Human
Rights and the Media (Singapore: Asian Institute for Development Communication; Friedrich Naumann
Foundation, Singapore Office, 1996) 69 at 69–79; James Gomez, Freedom of Expression and the Media
in Singapore (Singapore: Article 19, 2005); Tey Tsun Hang, “Confining the Freedom of the Press in
Singapore—A ‘Pragmatic’ Press for ‘Nation Building’?” (2008) 30 Hum. Rts. Q. 876; Cherian George,
Freedom from the Press: Journalism and State Power in Singapore (Singapore: National University of
Singapore Press, 2012); “Freedom of Speech, Assembly and Association” in Thio, Treatise, supra note
99, at paras. 14.098–14.127.
183 Now in the NPPA (Cap. 206, 2002 Rev. Ed. Sing.), ss. 24, 25.
184 NPPA, ibid. s. 24(1). See Decline in the Rule of Law, supra note, 3 at 103–106.
185 Lee Kuan Yew v. Davies, supra note 152.
186 Attorney-General v. Wain [1991] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 85 (H.C.). See Decline in the Rule of Law, supra note 3
at 106–109.
187 Cap. 167A, 2001 Rev. Ed. Sing.
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congregations and holding office in religious publications.188 It concluded by call-
ing upon the administration of President George H. W. Bush to use “more forceful
public diplomacy” in publicly condemning ISA detentions and “[urging] an end to
the other troubling authoritarian trends documented in this report”.189
In a report called Rule of Law in Singapore published in 2007,190 Lawyers’Rights
Watch Canada alleged that defamation suits had been used “to stifle and punish
criticism by opposition politicians”, and they had created a “chilling effect… on
the freedom of political expression in Singapore”.191 It noted how defamation and
bankruptcy actions had led to Jeyaretnam twice losing his Parliamentary seat.192
Concern was also expressed about stringent limits on the freedom of assembly, which
had led to Chee Soon Juan being fined and imprisoned on a number of occasions for
taking part in public assemblies without the requisite permits; and detentions under
the ISA.193 The organization concluded that “Singapore is not governed by the rule
of law”.194
Similar sentiments were expressed by the International Bar Association Human
Rights Institute (“IBAHRI”) in its 2008 report, Prosperity versus Individual Rights?
Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in Singapore.195 The Institute
argued that political opposition and expression had been stifled by defamation laws—
referring specifically to the defamation suits brought against Jeyaretnam, Tang and
Chee196—and actions taken against websites.197 It also highlighted restrictions on
press freedom and free assembly, respectively in the form of defamation suits and
the NPPA,198 and the authorities’ refusal to issue permits for outdoor assemblies.199
Summing up, the IBAHRI said:200
The IBAHRI strongly encourages Singapore to engage with the international
community in a more constructive manner, and to take steps to implement inter-
national standards of human rights throughout Singapore. It is imperative that
188 Decline in the Rule of Law, supra note 3 at 109, 110.
189 Ibid. at 114, 115.
190 Kelley Bryan, Gail Davidson & Margaret Stanier, Rule of Law in Singapore: Independence
of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession in Singapore (Vancouver: Lawyers’ Rights Watch
Canada, 2007), online: Lawyers’Rights Watch Canada <http://web.archive.org/web/20080828044807/
http://www.lrwc.org/documents/LRWC.Rule.of.Law.in.Singapore.17.Oct.07.pdf> (last accessed: 25
September 2012).
191 Ibid. at 4.
192 Ibid. at 5–8.
193 Ibid. at 18, 19.
194 Ibid. at 21.
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Singapore now takes its place as a leader in the region, not only in business and
economic development, but in human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
A strong and robust rule of law requires respect for and protection of democracy,
human rights—including freedom of expression and freedom of assembly—and
an independent and impartial judiciary. The IBAHRI is concerned that, despite
many positive achievements, the Singapore Government is currently failing to
meet established international standards in these areas.
In its response to the report,201 the Ministry of Law said that it contained “serious
factual inaccuracies”.202 It noted that international law recognizes no unfettered
right for individuals or the media to malign the reputation of others with impunity,
and that Singapore courts are not alone in holding that no special privilege attaches to
criticism of politicians. In any case, truth is a complete defence to a defamation claim,
and other opposition politicians such as Chiam See Tong and Low Thia Khiang have
never defamed their political opponents. Chiam had, in fact, reached an out-of-court
settlement with two Government ministers whom he claimed to have defamed him,
and had successfully sued203 members of the SDP’s Central Executive Committee
for libel and had been awarded damages of $120,000.204 As regards press freedom,
the Ministry said that the NPPA was intended to:205
[P]rotect the public interest, prevent manipulation by foreign elements to glorify
offensive viewpoints and prevent newspapers from being used as instruments of
subversion. We make no apology for this, as freedom of the press does not,
in our view, equate to the press purporting to act as an unaccountable pressure
group.
It justified the banning of public protests by saying that “[w]e do not wish to follow
the path of some countries, where the will of the general electorate and of the elected
Government can be thwarted by demonstrations mounted by disaffected pressure
groups.”206 The Ministry affirmed that:207
The principle of the Rule of Law is fundamental in Singapore. The Singapore
Government exercises its authority through laws that are adopted and enforced by
an independent judiciary in accordance with established and accepted procedures.
No one is above the law.
201
“Singapore’s Response to the International Bar Association’s Report on Singapore”, annexed to a
letter (reference no LAW/06/021/026) dated 14 November 2008 from Mark Jayaratnam, Deputy
Director, Legal Policy Division, Ministry of Law, to the Chairman of the Human Rights Insti-
tute Council of the International Bar Association, online: Ministry of Law <http://app2.mlaw.gov.
sg/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=gDkKt5ebvTY%3d&tabid=204> (last accessed: 27 September 2012;
archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/6B1FmYJMJ>) [Response to the IBA’s Report].
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203 Chiam See Tong v. Ling How Doong [1996] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 942 (H.C.).
204 Response to the IBA’s Report, supra note 201 at paras. 41, 42.
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The World Justice Project has been publishing an annual Rule of Law Index since
2010. In its 2011 Index,208 it defines the rule of law as “a rules-based system in
which the following four universal principles are upheld”:209
• The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law.
• The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and fair, and protect fundamental rights,
including the security of persons and property.
• The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is
accessible, fair, and efficient.
• Access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical adjudi-
cators, attorneys or representatives, and judicial officers who are of sufficient
number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities
they serve.
These principles were the result of a deliberate choice to “strike a balance between
thinner and thicker conceptions of the rule of law”.210 As regards the inclusion of
the reference to fundamental rights, the report’s authors stated that:211
the rule of law must be more than merely a system of rules—that indeed, a
system of positive law that fails to respect core human rights guaranteed under
international law is at best ‘rule by law’, and does not deserve to be called a rule
of law system.
However,212
given the impossibility of assessing adherence to the full panoply of civil, political,
economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights recognized in the Universal
Declaration [of Human Rights], the principles treat a more modest menu of rights,
primarily civil and political, that are firmly established under international law
and bear the most immediate relationship to rule of law concerns.
The Rule of Law Index ranked Singapore highly on factors such as order and security
(with a ranking of 2 out of the 66 countries assessed), absence of corruption (4/66),
and effective criminal justice (5/66), but less highly on open government (19/66),
limited government powers (20/66) and fundamental rights (39/66).213 It commented
that “[n]otwithstanding the country’s outstanding performance in most categories,
there are substantial limitations on freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, with
Singapore in 49th and 60th place, respectively, out of all 66 countries”.214
This brief review does not examine all the critiques of human rights protection
in Singapore; it covers the main ones in which Government critics have overtly
employed rule of law discourse. The explicit references to human rights in these
208 Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero & Alejandro Ponce, The World Justice Project Rule of Law
Index 2011 (Washington, D.C.: The World Justice Project, 2011), online: The World Justice Project
<http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011_Report.pdf> (last
accessed: 27 September 2012; archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/66VRkmcQK>).
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critiques point to substantive conceptions of the rule of law. Jeyaretnam’s 1989
conference paper, which referred to socio-economic rights such as rights to housing
and labour, evinces aspects of the thickest form of the substantive conception. Most
other critics focus on the extent to which civil and political rights are, in their view,
protected in Singapore and, by implication, the importance of democracy. Thus,
their views of the rule of law can be classified as thin or intermediate substantive
conceptions.
As mentioned earlier, a number of Government ministers and PAP MPs who spoke
during the 1999 parliamentary debate on the rule of law appeared to hold more formal
conceptions of the rule of law. Because opposition MPs charged that the Govern-
ment had failed to uphold the rule of law by breaching fundamental liberties, this
became a comparison between apples and oranges, and ultimately a rather ‘fruitless’
debate. However, an attitudinal shift is detectable in the Government’s response
to the IBAHRI’s 2008 report. It called attention to the fact that the fundamentals
for Singapore’s success include “[f]ree and fair elections held regularly” and “[a]
free society where individual human dignity is protected”, but “[t]he reality is that
there are often situations where the pursuit of one norm conflicts with another and
decisions have to be taken on the appropriate balance to be struck between them”.215
These statements—together with the Government’s defence of Singapore’s laws—
arguably embody a substantive conception of the rule of law, but one that favours
communitarian values over individual rights. One scholar has characterized this as
a “competing ‘thick’ version [of the rule of law] fashioned after an illiberal model
which prioritises statist goals like economic growth and social control by a relatively
incorrupt government”.216
III. Concluding Thoughts
I conclude with one final example of the current state of play. In 2009 the International
Section of the New York State Bar Association held its fall meeting in Singapore.
During a plenary session, Minister for Law K. Shanmugam delivered a speech on
the Government’s conception of the rule of law.217 While he said he would not try to
215 Response to the IBA’s Report, supra note 201, at paras. 22, 32.
216 Li-ann Thio, “Rule of Law within a Non-liberal ‘Communitarian’ Democracy: The Singapore Expe-
rience” in Randall Peerenboom, ed., Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation
of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the US (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004)
183 at 208. See also Gordon Silverstein, “Singapore: The Exception that Proves Rules Matter” in
Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, eds., Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 73 at 98:
China has (as have others no doubt) studied the ways in which Singapore has come to under-
stand that the basic requirements of the rule of law can be embedded in a ‘non-liberal thick
conception’… just as it can be embedded in a liberal, thick conception as in the United States
and Europe.
For a book-length treatment, see Jothie Rajah, Authoritarian Rule of Law: Legislation, Discourse and
Legitimacy in Singapore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
217 K. Shanmugam, “Speech by Minister for Law K. Shanmugam at the New York State Bar Associa-
tion (NYSBA) Rule of Law Plenary Session” (27 October 2009), online: Ministry of Law <http://
app2.mlaw.gov.sg/News/tabid/204/Default.aspx?ItemId=444> (last accessed: 28 September 2012;
archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/5l3ykltXH>).
Sing. J.L.S. Shall the Twain Never Meet? 327
define the rule of law comprehensively or attempt an academic analysis, he identified
the following elements as “key aspects of a society based on Rule of Law”:218
(1) Exercise of State power should be through laws that are publicly known and
enacted legitimately.
(2) There should be independent, credible Courts to apply the law and decide on
disputes between individuals, as well as between individuals and the State.
There must be Separation of Powers.
(3) No person should be above the law. That should apply in equal measure to
the Government and officials as much as it does to everyone else.
(4) There should be credible and effective means for people to challenge the
arbitrary exercise of power.
The foregoing are very much in line with a formal conception of the rule of law.
However, Shanmugam went on to mention two elements which were “part of a
broader framework”. Although he felt it was “debatable whether they are part of a
strict definition of Rule of Law… most people will accept them as being part of how
a modern civilised society should be structured”. These were the “sovereign right”
of the people to elect their government, and the requirement that “laws must not
offend… society’s norms of fairness and justice”.219 These allusions to democracy
and human rights suggest a substantive conception of the rule of law of intermediate
thickness, applying Tamanaha’s typology.
However, as other points made by the Law Minister bear out, the conception
requires restrictions on human rights to ensure stability and promote economic
growth. Democracy is seen as a prerequisite for giving the Government a strong
mandate to implement, with minimal obstacles, policies that it deems best for Sin-
gapore.220 The Minister spoke of four essential conditions for establishing a proper
system of governance in Singapore: the rule of law, stability, security from external
threats, and a high-quality public service.221 He saw the rule of law as a means to
prevent the oppression of minorities by the majority, and to provide a secure environ-
ment for foreign investment.222 As for stability, the serious Communist threat that
Singapore faced from the 1950s and continuing extra-constitutional threats today
justify the use of the ISA.223 Stability is achieved through, inter alia, the Govern-
ment having power to act without hindrances such as lobbying and street protests, as
“Government action has to be effective, efficient and speedy” in order to respond to
changes in the external environment.224 Shanmugam said that some of the Govern-
ment’s foreign critics fail to see problems arising in their own jurisdictions, are wont
to assume that the values of Singapore society are the same as their societies’ values,
and do not understand the need for different approaches for different societies.225
However, the Western liberal model of government (for example, having a press with
few restrictions—which usually means a press controlled by magnates) cannot be
218 Ibid. at para. 6.
219 Ibid. at para. 7.
220 Ibid. at para. 54.
221 Ibid. at paras. 16, 17.
222 Ibid. at paras. 22, 25–31.
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applied without regard to “whether the people are empowered enough to work the
levers of such a democracy”.226 Ultimately, “[e]very society seeks to strike a balance
between the rights of the individual and the rights of society… We do tend to weight
the balance more towards the society…”227
The response by Michael Galligan, Chairman of the NewYork State Bar Associa-
tion’s International Section,228 conceived of the rule of law from a more conventional,
liberal substantive standpoint. Nonetheless, he was sensitive to the need for assessing
the extent to which rights might require curtailment. While he accepted that there
were historical reasons for the introduction of the ISA, “whatever might be appropri-
ate for times of extraordinary danger should not be assumed to be the measure for
ordinary times”.229 He also noted that in Singapore libel claims are “a potent instru-
ment in contests for political office and public opinion”230 because of the combined
effect of constitutional provisions disqualifying people from being MPs if bankrupt
or convicted of crimes and punished with a fine exceeding $2,000; the existence of
the offence of criminal defamation; and, in civil defamation, the absence of a cap on
the quantum of damages, and the lack of qualified privilege for political statements
even if the speaker is an election candidate.231 He suggested a number of alternative
methods for protecting politicians’ reputations which strike a better balance between
people being able to freely attack political opponents and the current state of the
law which has a chilling effect on political speech. For instance, speakers might be
permitted to rely on a defence of qualified privilege unless they acted with knowing
disregard or gross negligence, or successful claimants might be limited to recovering
only their legal costs.232
Likewise, a more appropriate balance can be struck between press freedom and
countervailing values such as the desirability of ensuring accurate reporting and fact-
based comment. Disagreeing with Shanmugam’s view of the media’s role as only
to provide information, he commented that it is hard for the media to report facts
without considering the significance of what was reported. Furthermore, “limiting
the role of the press to strict news reporting with no apparent room for comment
or opinion denies to the press its function as a medium of political discussion and
debate”.233 He concluded:234
I do not consider a purely formal or “thin” definition of “rule of law” to be
adequate. Law does not exist in a social vacuum. It has purposes related to its
social context. The extent or degree to which a nation needs a law or laws at
all depends on the purposes or functions the law intends to serve—in particular,
with regard to the rights and dignities of the individuals for whom the law is
designed—in a manner that calls to mind to the way in which the US Supreme
226 Ibid. at para. 51.
227 Ibid. at paras. 78, 79.
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Court from time to time has found that determining what “process” is “due” under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution depends on the nature of the
liberty interest at stake. In the scheme of matters for which adherence to the
“rule of law” is particularly important, the integrity of public discussion, public
debate and genuine choice in the process of electing governments should rank
high because elections determine who the leaders will be who will have primary
responsibility to see that the “rule of law” itself is sustained in public as well as
private life.
Shanmugam and Galligan both adopted substantive conceptions of the rule of law,
but differed over how the balance between human rights and other public interests
should be struck in Singapore law. Nonetheless, the significance of their debate lies
in the mutual recognition of the need to determine a suitable balance and, therefore,
the fact that the enjoyment of human rights is not absolute but may be limited for
proper reasons. The path to more constructive discussions has been laid—we may
hope there no longer exists a situation of “East is East, and West is West, and never the
twain shall meet”. Rather, “there is neither East nor West… [w]hen two strong men
stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth!”235 In the era of the
“new normal”236 of Singapore politics, following the PAP’s lowest vote share since
1965 and the loss of six parliamentary seats to the WP in the 2011 general election,237
and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s call for a “national conversation”238 about
the nation’s future, it will be interesting to see if there will be a policy shift towards
greater solicitude for human rights.
Has the rule of law’s formal conception outlived its usefulness? Paul Craig has
observed that “the adoption of a fully substantive conception of the rule of law has
the consequence of robbing the concept of any function which is independent of
the theory of justice which imbues such an account of law”.239 Thus, it might be
argued that the rule of law is more useful as a legal principle if confined to a thin
conception. If it is to be argued that laws and government policies should comply
with any substantive standards of democracy and human rights, then the standards
should be articulated distinctly and not wrapped up within the concept of the rule
of law.
Conversely, adopting a thin conception of the rule of law means that a particular
jurisdiction might have laws and policies that breach widely accepted standards of
democracy and human rights, but yet be able to claim that it is fully compliant with the
rule of law because its laws and policies are comprehensible, stable, made public, and
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so on. It is often pointed out that the Nazi regime in Germany systematically stripped
Jews of their civil liberties largely through legal means, including the Nuremberg
Laws.240 Such grossly discriminatory laws satisfy the rule of law in its formal
sense,241 but applying the term in this context tarnishes the doctrine as a whole.242
I have much sympathy for the latter view, and submit that there is no reason why
a substantive conception of the rule of law is necessarily more opaque than a formal
conception. Of course, the standard of human rights protection embodied in the rule
of law conception must be articulated. As Craig put it, if criticism of governmental
action “is posited upon the substantive conception of the rule of law then intellectual
honesty requires that this is made clear, and it also demands clarity as to the particular
theory of justice which informs the critique”.243 Yet, so long as the obligation to
safeguard human rights is acknowledged, it is not so important whether this should
be regarded as distinct from the rule of law doctrine or an inseparable part of it. The
crucial thing is that the rule of law, as a foundational constitutional principle, should
not be used as hollow rhetoric to obscure the real issues.
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